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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In a recent paper by Li and Yao [1], the authors mainly 
focused on pointing out the theoretical flaws in 
Moschandreas [2, 3], in which the author proposed a 
proposition, arguing that when a per unit cost is incurred, the 
producer who maximizes sales always reduces the output 
more substantially than the producer who maximizes profits. 
In addition to pointing that Moschandreas’ proposition is 
only valid for a very special case – when the cost functions 
are quadratic functions, a simple counter example was 
constructed by Li and Yao [1].  
 In this paper, we establish a much more general result 
than that shown in Li and Yao [1]. We intend to prove that, 
as long as the increase in per unit cost is not too substantial, 
a sales maximizer will show a more sensitive response than a 
profit maximize, no matter what cost function he has. As a 
result, a per unit tax introduced into a sales maximization 
industry may cause a much bigger negative welfare effect 
than if it were introduced into a profit maximization 
industry.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 While Baumol [4] indicated that maximization of the 
growth rate of sales is a motivational assumption for an 
oligopolistic firm, Baldwin [5] found that profit 
maximization closely approximates the actual motive of the 
typical large firm. Yet others suggested that corporate 
recognition of public responsibility can be another 
managerial motivation.  
 Past studies suggested that the type of management 
control may affect the behavior of the firms. While Monsen 
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and Downs [6] observed that the interest of firms that are 
controlled by management does not necessarily coincide 
with owners’ preferences, Boudreaux [7] and Palmer [8] 
proved that managers in management-controlled firms prefer 
activities that lead to lower risk than those resulting from 
owners’ decisions in owner-controlled firms, given that both 
managers and owners are having the identical expected 
utility-maximization. Furthermore, Amihud and Kamin [9] 
found that revenue maximizing behavior is more prevalent 
among management-controlled firms than among owner-
controlled ones, and more prevalent among oligopolistic 
firms than among particularly competitive firms. Moreover, 
the market power of firms was found to have a greater 
influence on the firms’ behavior than their type of control. 
 The constrained revenue maximization hypothesis has 
been explored in a variety of forms, among them are both 
single product and multi-product technologies with and 
without the embellishments[10-13]. One result is that given 
the resource base and cost structure/technology, both the 
sales maximizer and the profit maximizer will yield the same 
optimal output. Panik [14] showed that given resource, costs, 
and technology, both profit maximizers and profit-
constrained sales maximizers may use different combination 
of inputs. Specifically, if both types of firms have the same 
maximal activity mix, then given the technology constraints, 
the shadow price for the input of the revenue maximizer will 
exceed that of the profit maximizer by its market price. 
 Zabojnik [15] analyzed the effects of providing managers 
with incentives to maximize sales in addition to profits on 
managerial efforts and human capital investment. According 
to Baker, Jensen, and Murphy [16], the salaries of top 
executives increased by 3% when the firm’s sales increased 
by 10%. Zabojnik’s study revealed that the optimal incentive 
scheme for the manager in the presence of human capital 
investment will impact positively on sales and profits. For 
instance, by emphasizing sales, the worker’s bargaining 
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power will increase and hence he is more likely to acquire 
human capital that will eventually benefit the firm.  
 Applying the Cournot model for a duopolistic market in 
the automobile industry, Tabeta and Wang [17] provided an 
explanation for the huge trade deficit of the U.S. in relation 
to Japan based on an analysis of different strategic behaviors 
between U.S. firms and Japanese firms. There are several 
differences between Japanese and U.S. firms that result in 
the Japanese firm typically being more inclined to be a 
revenue maximizer, while the U.S. firm is more likely to be 
profit oriented. They showed that a revenue-maximizer (as in 
Japan) should obtain a larger market share and a higher 
profit than a profit-maximizer (like many in the U.S.). 
Blinder [18] too concluded that as long as it has a secure 
source of capital, a revenue-maximizer is at a distinct 
advantage when competing with profit-maximizers. Tabeta 
and Wang [17] further argued that if U.S. firms adopt a 
revenue maximizing strategy, an improvement in the trade 
deficit will result if they are in a matured market but mutual 
loss will be the consequence if they are in a declining 
market. In a declining market, the cultural-institutional 
equilibrium led to a bitter trade dispute; nevertheless, if both 
Japanese and U.S. firms adopted the profit maximizing 
strategy it would be an effective way of balancing trade. 
III. THE BACKGROUND 
 In order to compare the decision-making of a profit-
maximizing firm with a sales-maximizing firm, Baumol 
suggested three main differences between the behaviors of 
these two types of firms in his well-known book Economic 
Theory and Operation Analysis [19-21]. In the discussion, 
Baumol assumes that the sales maximizer is to choose an 
output to maximize the revenues while he is subject to some 
minimum profit constraint [21]. Baumol’s theoretical results 
have been very influential, having been quoted by many 
management textbooks which are currently in use.  
 These results are later quoted by Moschandreas [2, 3] as 
three predictions: 
 Prediction 1. Compared with a profit maximzer, a sales 
maximizer produces more and charges a lower price for 
his product. 
 Prediction 2. A sales maximizer will tend to spend more 
on advertising and other sales promotional activities 
than a profit maximizer. 
 Prediction 3. A sales maximizer will increase price and 
reduce production in response to an increase in fixed 
costs or lump sum taxes. 
 As regards to Prediction 3, and according to Baumol, sale 
maximizers will react to an increase in fixed costs or lump 
sum taxes while profit maximizers will not simply because 
the profit maximizing criterion MC = MR is not affected by 
an increase in fixed costs or lump sum taxes. However, 
Baumol did not provide any answer to the effect of an 
increase of per unit cost on the decision of a sales revenue 
maximizer nor that of a profit maximizer. In fact, answering 
this question is a bit more difficult than establishing the three 
predictions mentioned above. Moschandreas [2, 3] did try to 
establish a proposition as given below:1  
 Prediction 4. When an increase in variable costs or per 
unit tax is imposed, a sales maximizer will reduce output 
and increase price by a greater amount than a profit 
maximizer will. 
 Unfortunately this prediction is not correct in general. A 
counter-example was given by Li and Yao [1] who pointed 
out that this prediction is only valid for a very restricted case, 
i.e., when the cost functions are in quadratic form.  
 The contributions of Li and Yao [1] are somewhat 
limited in that there was no general conclusion as to under 
what circumstances the result of “Prediction 4” applies. In 
this paper we will conduct a deeper analysis in order to 
derive some general results particularly in theory and 
applications. 
IV. SOME GENERAL RESULTS 
 For simplicity, we only consider a monopoly firm or a 
firm in the perfect competition in our current model. We do 
not consider oligopolistic competition in this paper because 
the interaction among firms in such market makes the 
argument slightly more complicated. We leave it for future 
extension of this study.  
 We have seen that Prediction 4 in general is false. To 
compare the decision making of a profit maximizer and that 
of a sales maximizer in response to the increase of per unit 
cost, we need to make a more careful analysis. One 
important point we can make is that, whether the conclusion 
of Prediction 4 is true will depend on the minimum profit 
level m the firm has to attain while maximizing the sales. We 
will establish a general result, and then concentrate on some 
special cases. 
 For simplicity we consider the case in which a firm has a 
continuous and strictly concave profit function )(q!! =  
defined for all ) ,0[ !"q . Let q* be the unique maximum of 
)(q!  such that 0*)( >q! . It is reasonable to assume that 
for some Q > q*: 0)( =Q!  and 0)( <q!  for q > Q. We will 
compare the individual response of a profit maximizer and a 
sales maximizer to the introduction of a per unit tax t.  
 After the introduction of per unit tax t, the new profit 
function is  
tqqq != )()( ""                (1) 
)(q!  is obviously continuous and strictly concave. As a 
result, )(q!  has a unique maximum q , and of course 
*)()( qq !! < . 
 Let m > 0 be the minimum profit requirement for a sales 
maximizer. It is reasonable to assume that )(qm !" , 
otherwise the sales maximizer can never fulfill the minimum 
profit requirement.  
                                                
1 Please refer to Moschandreas [2], pp. 280279 ! ; and Moschandreas [3], pp. 202-
203. 
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 According to our assumptions, )(q!! =  must be strictly 
decreasing in the interval [q*, ∞], and there exists a unique 
Q* in this interval such that mQ =*)(! , Note that q* and 
Q* will be the respective output of a profit maximizer and a 
sales maximizer before per unit tax is introduced. And note 
that the value of Q* depends on m, and since )(q!  is 
strictly increasing and continuous in [q*, ∞], Q* = Q*(m) is 
well-defined and is continuous in m. 
 After per unit tax is introduced, as mentioned above, a 
profit maximizer will produce quantity q . Note that )(q!  is 
strictly decreasing and eventually becomes negative. There 
must exist a unique qQ >  such that !(Q) = !(Q)" tQ -. 
= m This Q  is the quantity produced by the sales maximizer 
after per unit tax is introduced. Again Q  depends on m, and 
Q = Q (m) is well-defined and continuous. To compare the 
values of QQqq *,,*, , we have: 
 Lemma. We always have q  < q* and Q (m) < Q*(m) 
for every m, i.e. when the per unit cost increases or the per 
unit tax is introduced, both the profit maximizer and the 
sales maximizer will reduce their outputs. 
 Proof. Because the profit function )(q!! =  is strictly 
concave, the derivative )(' q!  is decreasing. Note that q* is 
determined by 0*)(' =q!  and q  is determined by 
0)(')(' =!= tqq ""  or .)(' tq =!  Thus, *)(')(' qq !! >  
implies q  < q*.  
 To see that Q (m) < Q*(m), we consider two cases. If 
Q (m) ≤ q*, then Q (m) < Q* is trivial. If Q (m) > q*, then 
*)()())(( QmmQcmmQ !! =>+=  and that )(q!  is 
decreasing in [q*, ∞] and this implies Q (m) < Q*. QED.   
 We will establish a general result: 
 Proposition 1. Assume that the profit function )(q!  is 
continuous and strictly concave. When per unit tax t is 
introduced and the profit maximizer reduces her output from 
q* to q  , there always exists an interval )]( ,( qm ! , such 
that when )]( ,( qmm !" , the sales maximizer will reduce 
output and increase price by an amount greater than (q*- q ). 
 Put in another way, proposition 1 states: If the minimum 
profit requirement upon a sales maximizer is sufficiently 
high, then his reaction to the introduction of per unit tax will 
be more substantial than that of a profit maximizer. 
 Proof. What we want to show is that in some interval    
of m: 
qqmQmQ !>! *)()(*          (2) 
 For )(qmm !==  we have: Q(m*) = q,  Q ,-            
* (m*) > q *  and therefore  
 qqmQmQ !>! *)()(*              (3) 
 Note that )()(* mQmQ !  depends on m continuously. 
Thus there exists a neighborhood of m  in which proposition 
1 remains true. In particular, there is an interval 
)]( ,(],( qmmm !=  in which proposition 1 holds. QED. 
 Example 1. Assume the inverse demand function for the 
firm being  
qp 01.05 != . 
where q is the quantity produced by the firm and p is the 
market clearing price. Assume that this firm has the piece-
wise linear cost function originally, as shown in Fig. (1). 
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 This was the counter-example in which Li and Yao [1] 
showed that Moschandreas’s “Prediction 4” is in general not 
correct. They assumed that the minimum profit required for 
the firm was m=2, comparing the decision changes between 
a profit maximizer and a sales maximizer when per unit cost 
was increased by 0.5. They showed that the profit maximizer 
reduced his output by 4, and yet the sales maximizer reduced 
her output by 0.97 only.  
 However, for this same example, with per unit cost 
increased by the same amount of 0.5, if we confine the 
minimum profit values of m∈(3.341, 3.49) other than 
maintaining m=2, then the result in Moschandreas’s 
“Prediction 4” would have been correct. (see Fig. 2). 
Therefore, in general which type of producer adjusts more in 
terms of output will depend on the magnitude of the 
minimum profit he or she wants to guarantee. 
 By the way, for some special forms of profit functions, 
the conclusion of Proposition 1 is true for all values of m, i.e. 
for all ],( mm !"# . All quadratic profit functions are in this 
category. 
 Proposition 2. Assume that the firm has a linear inverse 
demand function BqAp !=  and a quadratic cost function 
2
EqDqCTC ++=  ( 0,0,0,0,0 !!>>> ECDBA  are all 
constants), then when per unit cost increases or per unit tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (1). Cost function. 
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is imposed, a sales maximizer will reduce output and 
increase price by a greater amount than a profit maximizer. 
 Proof. It is easy to derive the profit function 
2)()( qEBqDAC +!!+!="          (5) 
 For convenience we introduce the notations: 
!=C , !=" DA , !=+ EB         (6) 
 Then we can write  
!"#$ %+%= qq 2          (7) 
 It is reasonable to assume that 0>!  and !"# 42 >  so 
that there exists a range of q  for positive profits. It is easy to 
compute the optimal quantity for profit maximization: 
 
!
"
2
* =q          (8)  
 Imagine that per unit cost increases by t, so the profit 
function is changed to !"#$ %%+%= qtqq )()( 2 . Again 
it is reasonable to assume that t < β so that the maximum 
profit is positive. It is easy to verify that the optimal quantity 
for profit maximization is: 
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and the maximum profit is: 
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 Thus we have 
!2
*
t
qq =" . We need to verify for all 
mm ! : 
!2
)()(*
t
mQmQ >"        (11) 
 Note that Q*(m) and )(mQ  are, respectively, the larger 
root of the equations: 
mqq =!+! "#$ 2 , and mqtq =!!+! "#$ )(2     (12) 
 By directly solving quadratic equations: 
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 We thus have: 
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 The inequality holds because  
0)(4)()(4 22 >+!!!+! mtm "#$"#$     (15) 
 QED. 
 For a general “negative” result we have: 
 Proposition 3. Define d = q*- q . If for the minimum 
profit level m, it holds that ))(())(( dmQmQ +> !! , then 
a sales maximizer reduces output and increases price by a 
smaller amount than the profit maximizer. 
 Proof. By definition ))(*())(( mQmQ !! = . Therefore 
))(())(( dmQmQ +> !!  implies ))(())(*( dmQmQ +> !! . 
Because π(q) is strictly decreasing in [q*, ∞] , we thus    
have dmQmQ +< )()(* , which is equivalent to 
qqmQmQ !<! *)()(* . QED. 
 Let us give an example to illustrate the result of 
Proposition 3. This seems to be a more “natural” counter-
example against Moschandreas’ result. 
Example 2. Consider a firm with profit function 
5)5()( 4 +!!= qq" (say, with inverse demand ,500 qp !=  
and TC 34 20qq != 2150q+ 620+ ). The optimal output 
for profit maximization is q* = 5. Imagine that the 
government imposes a per unit tax of 0.5. Then the new 
profit function is 55.0)5()( 4 +!!!= qqq" , and the 
new optimal output for profit maximization is 4.5, i.e. d = 
0.5. Now consider the decision of a sales maximizer. 
Assume that the minimum profit required is m = 1. It is easy 
to compute 6=Q .  
 By direct calculation,  
010625.0)6()5.6()()( <!!=!=!+ """" QdQ      (16) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (2). The decision makings of a profit maximizer and a        
sales maximizer before and after the imposition of per unit cost 
(example 1). 
Notes: When profit = 2, note that qq !*  > QQ !* , where  
*q  = Output produced by a profit maximizer before the imposition 
of a per unit cost  
q  = Output produced by a profit maximizer after the imposition of 
a per unit cost  
*Q  = Output produced by a sales maximizer before the imposition 
of a per unit cost Q  = Output produced by a sales maximizer after 
the imposition of a per unit cost  
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 Thus by Proposition 3, the sales maximizer reduces 
output and increases price by a smaller amount than the 
profit maximizer. In fact, before per unit tax is imposed, the 
sales maximization output is 6.36778…; after the tax is 
imposed, the sales maximization output is 5.99035…. The 
change in output is 0.37. 
V. WHAT’S THE WRONG WITH THE ARGUMENT 
FOR PREDICTION 4? 
 Moschandreas’ [2, 3] argument for Prediction 4 was 
made by applying the idea of geometric transformation. It is 
argued that, after per unit tax is introduced, the total cost 
curve is shifted upward and pivoted to the left – or more 
precisely – rotated counter-clockwise. (And as a result, the 
profit curve is shifted downward and rotated clockwise.) 
This is generally incorrect. In most cases, the new cost curve 
cannot be obtained from the old one through a translation 
and a rotation, and neither can the new profit curve be 
obtained from the old one through a translation and a 
rotation. To see this, it is sufficient to show that the new 
curve is not congruent with the old one, because the 
transformation from the old to the new is not distance-
reserved.  
 Let us revisit Example 1. The new cost curve C1 and the 
old one C0 are sketched in Fig. (3).  
 The two corner points on the old cost curve C0 are (1, 1) 
and (5, 20), and the two corner points on the new cost curve 
C1 are (1, 1.5) and (5, 22.5). Obviously the distance between 
the two corner points on the new cost curve is greater than 
that between the two corner points on the old cost curve.  
 Let us revisit Example 2. The profit curve π3 before per 
unit tax introduced and π4, the profit curve after per unit tax 
is introduced are shown in Fig. (4). Obviously π4 cannot be 
obtained from π3 through a translation and a pivot to the 
right. 
CONCLUSION 
 Having discussed completely the responses of a profit 
maximizer and a sales maximizer to the introduction of per 
unit tax (or per unit cost increase), we establish general 
results as stated in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. In 
addition, we point out that in other cases, Prediction 4 by 
Moschandreas [2, 3] can be false. As long as the increase in 
per unit cost is not too substantial, a sales maximizer will 
show a more sensitive response than a profit maximize, no 
matter what cost function he has. Since a per unit tax 
introduced into a sales maximization industry may cause a 
much bigger negative welfare effect than if it were 
introduced into a profit maximization industry, when the 
government considers an introduction of per unit sales tax 
into an industry, it pays to estimate the welfare effects 
accordingly, and on a case-by-case basis.  
 The goal of sales maximization can be explained by the 
management’s desire to maintain a firm’s competitive 
position, which depends largely on its size. Unlike the 
shareholders who are interested in profit, the management is 
interested in sales revenue, either because large sales revenue 
is a matter of prestige or because its remuneration is often 
related to the size of the firm’s operations than to its profits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (3). Cost functions before and after the imposition of per unit 
tax. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (4). The decision makings of a profit maximizer and a sales maximizer before and after the imposition of per unit tax (example 2). 
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In practice sales maximization is quite frequently observed 
in many industries. As mentioned earlier, in the case of the 
automobile industry, it has been shown that the adoption of a 
revenue maximizing strategy by U.S. firms can lead to an 
improved trade deficit in a matured market but it can result 
in mutual loss in a declining market [17]. And an effective 
way of balancing the trade would be for both Japanese and 
U.S. firms to adopt the profit maximizing strategy. 
Additionally, Blinder [18] demonstrated that a revenue-
maximizer with a strong financial backing has more 
competitive advantages than his profit-maximizing partner. 
Furthermore, in the market for human capital, Zabojnik [15] 
found that it may be optimal for owners of firms who 
maximize profits to provide managers with incentives to 
maximize sales in addition to profits. This may affect the 
result of the bargaining game between workers and managers 
on workers' wages, and it may also solve the problem of 
underinvestment by workers in specific human capital. It can 
be demonstrated further that an optimal managerial contract 
is a function of sales in addition to profits. In summary, these 
studies highlight the importance of the behavior of a sales-
maximizer and the application of sales maximization in 
management sciences. 
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